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The final stage of the catching-up process has formidable hurdles. This paper examines 
the case of Taiwan’s motorcycle industry and shows how latecomers overcame the 
hurdles. In the early 1990s, the two largest motorcycle makers in Taiwan, Sanyang and 
Kwang Yang, had completed the catching-up process and became independent from 
Honda, on which they had technologically depended since the early 1960s. The requisite 
for independence was acquiring the capacity for product innovation. The two assemblers 
could cultivate technological capacity by investing abundant resources, which they 
accumulated in the protected market. It should be noted that although the market was 
protected and highly concentrated, it was also very competitive. Another condition was 
the solid local suppliers of parts and components. The local suppliers had also grown 
under the government’s industrial policies. However, their development beyond imitators 
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Since Gerschenkron (1962)’s argument about late industrialization, 
adequate knowledge has been accumulated on the same. Two significant 
propositions have emerged. One is that latecomers can catch up with the 
advanced countries by accelerating the process of their industrialization. 
The other is that government plays a crucial role in late industrialization. 
This paper attempts to further discuss these propositions and deepen the 
understanding about late industrialization. 
Latecomers try to develop their manufacturing sectors following the path of 
advanced countries. Gerschenkron indicated that latecomers can achieve 
their targets if they pursue them at higher speed than they get forward at 
the frontier. In this process, their most critical challenges pertain to the 
narrowing technological gaps between them. Amsden (1990; 2001) 
maintained that latecomers in the postwar period were able to acquire 
technologies by means of learning and, in this respect, they are significantly 
different from the first mover, England, which accomplished inventions and 
from other advanced countries that developed by means of innovation. 
Latecomers strive to learn about new technologies from the advanced 
countries in various ways such as imitation, purchase of modern machines 
and equipments, technology transfer contracts, foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and subcontracting, as argued by previous studies. 
However the existing studies have not paid sufficient attention to one 
crucial problem: the catching-up process is not monotonous. For instance, 
Suehiro (2008) comprehends a wide range of arguments on late 
industrialization, but does not make any explicit reference to this issue. In 
particular, the final stage of the process has two formidable hurdles. First, 
the technology that the latecomers need to learn at this stage is more 
sophisticated and complicated. It should be particularly noticed that more 
fundamental knowledge for innovation is essentially difficult to transfer 
because most of it is tacit and deeply rooted in the organizations. Second 
and more important, in the final stage, latecomers cannot use many 
channels of technology transfer that they were previously dependent upon. 
The completion of catching-up implies that firms in latecomer countries 
acquire the capacity to compete with those in the advanced countries on   2
equal terms. Therefore, the latter prevent the state-of-art technology from 
spilling over to the former in order to maintain their leading positions. How 
do latecomers get through the final stage of being independent and 
equivalent to the advanced firms? What factors provoke, back up, or 
obstruct latecomers’ challenges? A closer analysis of these questions is 
indispensable in order to gain a comprehensive understanding on the 
catching-up process. 
Another proposition asserted by previous studies is that government’s role 
is vital in late industrialization. Gerschenkron demonstrated that in a less 
developed country like Russia, the government needed to exercise a 
stronger and more direct leadership. Amsden maintains that the 
government should intervene in market mechanism so as to promote 
industrialization, since only government’s intervention can create 
opportunities to learn. 
On the one hand, this study offers some evidence that supports the views of 
Gerschenkron and Amsden. On the other hand, however, I try to modify 
their argument. The previous studies overestimate government’s role to the 
extent that they tend to undervalue the impacts of firms’ activities. There is 
no doubt in the fact that government is capable of improving conditions and 
encouraging firms’ learning; however, in many cases, government is unable 
to provide them with entirely sufficient incentives or to force them to learn 
new technology. Further, as long as firms design the details of the learning 
process, their strong and spontaneous motivations are indispensable. In 
particular, the final stage of the catching-up process is replete with risks, 
owing to which the incentives provided by government are not sufficient to 
encourage firms to step forward. Only if firms themselves realize that the 
challenges are necessary, they decide to undertake them. Therefore, we 
have to closely consider the views and behavior of firms as well as the 
policies of government. 
This study attempts to modify the arguments on late industrialization by 
examining the case of Taiwan’s motorcycle industry.1  Taiwan is, in general, 
supposed to be one of the most successful cases of late industrialization in 
the postwar period. In addition, Taiwan’s motorcycle industry is a typical 
case of accomplishing catching-up and overcoming the dependence on 
                                            
1  I have written two Japanese papers on Taiwan’s motorcycle industry (Sato, 1999; 
2006). I integrated these papers into this paper with some significant improvements.   3
advanced firms. Since many years, Japanese firms have been globally 
predominant in the motorcycle industry. In particular, Honda has been 
extremely strong and has retained dominant shares in many markets. 
Taiwan’s motorcycle industry had been dependent on Honda and other 
Japanese firms since the early 1960s. In the 1990s, however, Taiwan’s 
motorcycle firms eventually succeeded in overcoming Japanese hegemony 
and becoming independent. Today, no other matches up to Taiwan. How did 
Taiwanese motorcycle firms accomplish the catching-up process? In 
particular, how did they overcome the hurdles in the final stage of the 
catching-up? The answers to these questions might lead to the ones to the 
general questions mentioned above. 
The following argument has two steps. First, I will show the direct reasons 
for overcoming the hurdles in the final stage of catching-up. Two factors are 
necessary and sufficient for accomplishing catching-up. One is acquiring the 
capacity for product innovation. Another is the development of independent 
parts and components suppliers. As the second step, I examine the reasons 
for the two factors. I focus on the role of the state, the influence of the 
structure of the global industry, and the local firms’ initiatives by referring 
to the case of Taiwan’s auto industry. 
This study has three sections, in addition to a conclusion as well as an 
introduction. The first section illustrates the catching-up attainment of 
Taiwan’s motorcycle industry by observing its firms, production, export, and 
outward investment. The second section demonstrates two direct factors for 
the industry’s success in catching up, and the third section argues the 
mechanisms behind the two factors. The conclusion summarizes the 
argument, derives some implications, and shows the problems prevalent at 
the post-catching-up stage. 
 
 
I  Catching-up  Process  of  Taiwan’s Motorcycle Industry 
 
In this section, I will show the catching-up process of Taiwan’s motorcycle 
industry by focusing on the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. 
This industry finished the catching-up process by the mid-1990s and 
stepped into a new stage in the late 1990s. I argue this situation at the 
post-catching-up stage in the conclusion.   4
Firms and Production 
Taiwan’s motorcycle industry emerged in the 1950s. In those days, 
motorcycles were protected from imports, and the quality of the products, 
which were made of imported parts, was very low. When the government 
lifted the protection in 1959, local assemblers were immediately weeded out 
by the imports. Therefore, the actual starting point of Taiwan’s motorcycle 
industry was the establishment of Sanyang Industry, Co. Ltd. in 1961, 
which followed the reintroduction of the ban on imports in the same year. 
Sanyang contracted technical assistance with Honda.2 The subsequent two 
years saw 11 newcomers including Kwang Yang Motor Co., Ltd., which was 
technically supported by Honda. A dozen other assemblers entered the 
market when the restriction on building a new factory was lifted in 1965. In 
1968, however, most of them exited owing to introduction of some 
regulations such as ban on riding a motorcycle below 50 cc. Only twelve 
assemblers remained by the end of the year. Further, the industry 
comprised around 10 assemblers, with the exception of several makers’ 
entry in 1980. 
Figure 1 shows the production from 1976 to 1995. The production in 
Taiwan’s motorcycle industry was more than 300 thousand in 1976 and had 
rapidly increased to 746 thousand in the consecutive three years; the scale 
was only next to Japan in Asia. 
The industry stagnated in the early 1980s mainly because of slack economy 
growth. The slump brought in some structural changes. First, Honda 
invested in Kwang Yang in order to rescue the company as it lost a large 
portion of its market shares in the early 1980s.3 Second, Yamaha and 
Suzuki groups restructured themselves. They had two related companies 
each in Taiwan like Honda. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. provided technical 
                                            
2  In the late 1960s, Honda began providing Sanyang technical assistance on 
manufacturing automobiles, and in 1974, it invested in 13% of its equity through its 
U.S. subsidiary in order to prevent Sanyang from cooperating with the other auto 
makers (Chang, 1987: 142). 
3  The actual situation is more complicated. Kwang Yang’s slump was brought in not 
only by the shrunk market but also by the battle between Honda and Yamaha 
(so-called HY War). In 1981, Yamaha also attacked Honda’s partners in Taiwan by 
introducing a new model of scooter into the island market through Wanshan Industry, 
which Yamaha provided technical assistance. According to my interview with one 
person related to Honda on September 19, 2005, although Honda provided Sanyang 
with a matching model, it could only supply the one-generation older model with 










































assistance to Kung Hsue She Co., Ltd. and Wanshan Industry. Considering 
their deteriorating performances, Yamaha Motor decided to carry out a 
radical reform. In 1986, it established Yamaha Motor Taiwan Co., Ltd with 
Kung Hsue She holding 51% of the equity. Kung Hsue She retreated itself 
from the motorcycle business. Wanshan also disbanded and Yamaha Motor 
Taiwan bought out its factory. Suzuki Motor Corp. also reorganized one of 
its two related companies, Tai Lung Machinery Co., Ltd., into a joint 
venture, Tai Ling Engineering and Development Co. Ltd., in 1984, and Tai 
Ling took over the equipment and employees of another related company, 
Suzuki Industrial, in 1990. Further, Japan’s Suzuki held 20% of Tai Ling’s 
equity. 
Owing to the prosperity in the late 1980s, the island’s market quickly 
extended again and the production exceeded one million in 1988. At the 
same time, the newly established Yamaha Motor Taiwan adopted innovative 
policies on products line-up and sales, which made a significant 
contribution to the expansion of demand by attracting new users such as 
females and youth. Sanyang and Kwang Yang also followed it immediately. 
Consequently, the market share highly concentrated on these three firms.   
Following a temporary decline in 1989 and 1990, the production continued 
to increase and reached a peak of 1,695 thousand in 1995. The growth in the 
early 1990s was largely attributable to export. 
In the late 1980s, Sanyang and Kwang Yang started efforts to break the 
constraints imposed by Honda. They had accepted restrictions on some   6
operations, including export, for the sake of benefits from Honda’s technical 
assistance. However, Sanyang clearly indicated its willingness to be 
independent of Honda, and the government supported it. Initially, Kwang 
Yang hesitated to follow Sanyang, but eventually, adopted a more active 
stance. A change of contract between Taiwanese firms and Honda 
demonstrates the process of their independence. According to the original 
contracts, the roles of Sanyang and Kwang Yang were principally restricted 
to the production and sales of models designed by Honda in Taiwan. At the 
1991 revision, the restriction on export was removed. However, the revised 
contract still assumed that Taiwan’s two assemblers heavily depended on 
Honda and obliged them to pay 2% for domestic sales and 4% for export, 
under which the R&D efforts of the two assemblers could not sufficiently 
pay off. The 1994 revision overcame this problem. Under the new contract, 
they only needed to pay for Honda’s patents, which they actually used (ITRI, 
1996: Chapter 2, 25). This contract between Kwang Yang and Honda 
expired in 1997, and a new contract was not concluded (Taiwan Jicheshi 
Bianji Weiyuanhui, 1998: 67).4 The capital relations between Sanyang and 
Honda were dissolved in 2002 and those between Kwang Yang and Honda 
were dissolved in 2003. 
 
Export and Outward Investment 
Sanyang and Kwang Yang’s efforts to be independent from Honda were 
motivated by their desire to enter the overseas market. In the 1980s, 
although the Taiwan market had considerably grown, the saturation was 
supposed to be inevitable in the near future, considering the island’s 
population. In order to sustain growth, the two Taiwanese assemblers 
needed to advance to the foreign market. For this purpose, it was 
indispensable for them to get rid of the constraints on export and outward 
investment.5 
Figure 2 shows that Taiwan’s export was rather insignificant, and its export 
                                            
4  Although I have not confirmed the technical relation between Sanyang and Honda, it 
is supposed to be almost similar to the relation between Kwang Yang and Honda.   
5  Contracts of technical assistance between Taiwanese and foreign motorcycle makers 
usually included restriction on the formers’ export. Yen (1983: 32) shows that of the 10 
Taiwanese motorcycle makers, which contracted technical assistance with foreign 
makers, seven makers answered that their export was restricted and eight makers 
answered that their export needed permission from the foreign partners.   7
ratio stayed very low during the old regime before 1989. However, the 
export has abruptly and quickly increased, and the ratio has soared since 
the restraint on export was lifted in 1990. In 1995, Taiwan exported more 
than 500 thousand motorcycles, which was more than 30% of the total sales. 
It should also be noted that Taiwan’s success in exporting in the early 1990s 
was attributed to the fortunate corresponding with the emergence of the 
Chinese market. In 1995, 75% of the export was for Hong Kong. Indeed, 
Hong Kong was not the final destination, but an intermediary to China. In 
addition, Vietnam was also a constant absorber of Taiwan’s export. 
Another approach to foreign market is foreign direct investment. It is the 
only effective way to penetrate into a protected market in particular. In 
effect, China banned the import of SKD parts in 1995 (The Chinese Bank, 
1996: 15). Sanyang received the approval for investment in Vietnam from 
the Taiwan government in 1993 and for investment in Xiamen of China in 
1994. The initially planned scales of the annual production were 100 
thousand in Vietnam and 240 thousand in Xiamen. Kwang Yang planned to 
set up factories in Changsha and Changzhou of China and was approved by 
the government in 1993. Two factories were prepared for the production of 
150 thousand respectively. Kwang Yang also set up a factory in Indonesia in 
1996. The factory was planned to produce 200 thousands annually. 
Sanyang and Kwang Yang’s aggressive activities toward overseas market 
evidently demonstrated their independence from Honda. They could export 
and made FDI without any limitations by achieving technological autonomy 
and removing the conditions imposed by Honda. The significance of their 
independence might be more obvious as compared to that of Yamaha Motor 
Taiwan. Since Yamaha held the control of Yamaha Motor Taiwan with more 
than half of its equity, the latter’s activities followed the world strategy of 
the former. In the early 1990s, Yamaha Motor Taiwan was not positioned as 
an exporting base under Yamaha’s strategy. Therefore, its export ratio in 
1995 was only 6.8%, which was conspicuously lower than Sanyang’s 29.4% 
and Kwang Yang’s 47.3%.6 
 
                                            
6  Today, Yamaha Motor Taiwan is exporting more number of products because the 
parent company positions it as the base of development and production of small 




















































II  Perfecting  the  Catching-up 
 
Acquiring Capacity for Product Innovation 
A latecomer firm can accumulate technologies and skills through the 
technical support from advanced firms. However, this process has a limit 
because advanced firms never share all the technologies and skills with 
latecomer firms (Ohara 2006b). Advanced firms tend to maintain their 
leadership by not disclosing state-of-art technologies. In addition, in many 
cases, it is rather difficult to ascertain how to carry out innovation because 
the related knowledge is tacit and deeply rooted in the organization. This is 
a significant hurdle in the final stage of the catching-up process mentioned 
in the introduction. Consequently, latecomer firms are motivated to 
overcome dependence on advanced firms and to acquire new technologies 
and skills. 
Figure 3 1illustrates the concept of two types of catching-up paths and 
switching between them. Latecomer firms can produce advanced products 
on being assisted by advanced firms (A–B) and to accelerate its catching-up 
(D–E) compared to the path without assistance (D–G). However, the path 
has a ceiling (E–F). Therefore, latecomer firms need to switch the path and 
increase the technologies and skills alone (F–C) in order to sustain its 
technological development. 


























learn manufacturing skills from Honda and maintain the leading positions 
in the island’s industry.7  Although they became less dependent on Honda in 
the manufacturing process, their alliances with Honda never enabled the 
two assemblers with respect to product innovation because Honda by no 
means taught them the technology. Honda wished to keep its influence on 
them holding it closely. A staff of one of the two companies said, “We learned 
from Honda the process after a plan was completed, but did not learn how 
the plan was drawn up.”8 It was acquiring capacity for product innovation 
that Taiwan’s motorcycle industry must overcome at the final stage of 
catching-up. 
It should be noted that switching the paths entails the risk of inviting a 
severe difficulty. Considering latecomer firms’ independent R&D activities, 
advanced firms might withdraw their assistance as a sanction. At the 
moment, however, latecomer firms have not yet acquired sufficient 
                                            
7  One instance is the case shown in footnote 3. In the early 1980s, Wanshan, backed up 
by Yamaha Motor, challenged Sanyang and Kwang Yang by releasing a new model of 
scooter, which caused several small firms to enter the scooter market. The two 
companies eventually fought off them in a resort to obtain Honda’s assistance. 
8  My interview on September 13, 2005   10
technologies and skills. In other words, latecomer firms are compelled to 
determine to embark on a venture for independence before the requirement 
for it was not fulfilled. Figure 3 depicts this problem. When latecomer firms 
decide to switch the path, they lose the assistance from advanced firms 
(point B to F). Latecomer firms would be seriously disadvantaged if their 
rivals continue to be supported by advanced firms. 
I n  r e a l i t y ,  t h e  c a s e  o f  K u n g  H s u e  She’s aborted challenge obviously 
illustrated this risk (Yen, 1983:44; Taiwan Jicheshi Bianji Weiyuanhui, 
1998: 52; 72–73). In 1976, with the support of the government, Kung Hsue 
She tried to become independent from Yamaha, which had provided it 
technical assistance for many years. Kung Hsue She stopped taking 
technical assistance from Yamaha and started to use its original brand KHS 
in place of Yamaha. Yamaha found a new partner, Wanshan Industry. 
Yamaha contracted technical assistance with it and allowed it to use the 
Yamaha brand. As a result, Kung Hsue She was deprived of a large share of 
the market by Wanshan. Its share dropped from 8.0% in 1978 to 4.9% in 
1980. Kung Hsue She’s failure was attributed to an immature R&D capacity 
as well as to a weak brand. For instance, Kung Hsue She only had the 
capacity to develop a frame of plate and was not capable of developing a 
frame of pipe, which was in fashion those days. Kung Hsue She resumed the 
relation with Yamaha in 1980 and its market share recovered to 7.0% in 
1982. 
In the process of challenge started in the late 1980s, Sanyang and Kwang 
Yang had to consider the risk because they were competing with Yamaha 
Motor Taiwan, which enjoyed the support of Yamaha Motor. The two 
companies were required to accomplish the challenge as soon as possible in 
order to introduce the new models into the market and to not lose large 
portions of the market. 
Two factors promoted Sanyang and Kwang Yang to switch the path of the 
catching-up. One was the matured technologies of motorcycle. If rapid 
innovation continued in the industry (A-J in Figure 3), their ventures on 
catching-up would have been extremely difficult. The other was the 
predictable saturation of the island’s market mentioned in the previous 
section. They had to acquire the capacities for product innovation and 
become independent from Honda in order to advance to the foreign markets. 
If the island’s market continued to expand, it would be less necessary for   11
them to switch the path at the risk of losing the market shares.   
Fortunately, for Sanyang and Kwang Yang, Honda’s hegemony over them 
solely rested on its technological capacity. Since Honda had minorities of the 
two companies’ equities, it was not able to control them depending on 
ownership. Therefore, Honda did not have the authority to stop their R&D 
activities. Further, Sanyang and Kwang Yang could be independent from 
Honda only if they matched Honda in technological capacity.   
In the late 1980s, Sanyang began R&D activities for the purpose of 
independence from Honda. The company spent 150 million NTD on R&D 
every year in the late 1980s (Lianhebao, Oct. 15, 1989) and furnished the 
equipments, which surpassed Industrial Technology Research Institute 
(ITRI), semi-governmental institution for industrial technologies, in 1990 
(Gongshang Shibao, June 30, 1990). As early as June 1988, it released a 125 
cc scooter—Fengsu—the aspect of which it designed by itself (Gongshang 
Shibao, Nov. 19, 1988). In 1990, it accomplished the full development of a 
new model Difei (Gongshang Shibao, June 30, 1990). 
Kwang Yang undertook the R&D activity for product innovation in 1987. 
Although its action was slightly delayed, it was not less aggressive than 
Sanyang. In 1990, the company employed more than 120 of the R&D staff 
and invested 70 million NTD in workstations, CAD/CAM, and test 
equipments for strength and electrical system (Gongshang Shibao, June 30, 
1990). 
The data of one of the two companies collected in 1993 and 19979 shows 
that the company employed more than 200 of the R&D staff in 1993 and 
around 300 in 1997 (including other target than motorcycle). No Japanese 
staff was dispatched from Honda. It held one set of test equipments and a 
test course. It also had the ability to develop large-size dies by itself. Its 
R&D expenditure was 500 to 600 million NTD in 1997, accounting for about 
5% of the total sales (also including other target than motorcycle). 
Two conditions enabled Sanyang and Kwang Yang to swiftly acquire the 
technology of product innovation. One was their own resources and 
                                            
9  The institute of Developing Economies conducted a research project on Japanese 
firms in Taiwan in 1993, and I participated in it as a project leader. The project team 
visited the company. Although I visited other company on that day and could not join 
the interview with the company, we shared the research result. We also visited two 
other motorcycle makers, which were capitalized by Japanese companies. In 1997, I 
myself visited the company and interviewed a manager.   12
capabilities. In the next section, I will argue how they obtained them. 
Another was the substitutive sources for technology. The equipments and 
staff were easily purchasable, but buying them was not sufficient and 
learning invisible know-how was necessary for product innovation. In our 
interview with another company of the two in 2005, they explained that 
they could develop new models by way of joint projects with some 
institutions in Europe that specialized in engines designs. More importantly, 
the company utilized the projects as opportunities to learn how to develop a 
new model.10 
The company was already capable of developing new models without 
support from other institutions, when we visited it in 2005. It possessed 
nine engine models for motorcycle and two models for ATV, which were 
classified by piston displacement. They were all developed after the alliance 
with Honda was dissolved. 
As a result of acquiring capacity for product innovation and completing 
catching-up, Sanyang and Kwang Yang had converted their relations with 
Honda and finally achieved independence, as shown in the previous section. 
It is also observed already that the removal of constraints brought about the 
rapid increase of export and aggressive outward investments. 
 
Building Independent Suppliers 
Another indispensable factor for the assemblers’ autonomy is independent 
suppliers of parts and components. A motorcycle is a machine assembled 
from many parts and components. While some of them are produced 
in-house by assemblers, others are procured from domestic and overseas 
suppliers. For instance, Kwang Yang procured approximately 60% of the 
parts and components from outside (Chang, 2005: 89).   
In the 1990s, almost all parts and components were procurable in Taiwan. 
The Taiwan government imposed the requirements for local content on the 
assemblers and had raised the ratio step by step: 30% in 1962, 40% in 1964, 
60% in 1966, 70% in 1969, 80% in 1973, and 90% in 1974 (Chang, 1987; 
Taiwan Jicheshi Bianji Weiyuanhui, 1998). All these requirements had been 
                                            
10 In 1996, ITRI organized a project for developing a large-scale motorcycle. Sanyang 
and Kwang Yang participated in it, through which they also learned how to develop a 
new product (my interview with the company on September 13, 2005). 
   13
satisfied quickly. A research conducted on 15 assemblers in 1970 shows that 
the average ratio of actual local content was 75% (Wang, 1971:140), while 
the government’s requirement was 70%. The three assemblers that we 
visited in 1993 procured more than 90% from domestic suppliers. The ratio 
of one of them was as high as 95%. In addition, it is also noteworthy that 
there were a small number of foreign firms in the suppliers. The ratios of 
Japanese firms in the numbers of the suppliers for the three assemblers 
were 13%, 15%, and 20% respectively.11  
Independent suppliers contribute to the two activities of assemblers. One is 
their product development, which is essential for their autonomy, as 
mentioned above. The assemblers depend on the suppliers not only in their 
production capacities but also in their R&D abilities. The development of a 
new product is a joint project by the assembler and the suppliers. The 
suppliers develop the individual parts and components, and the assembler 
carries out general design by integrating the parts and components as well 
as the development of engines. The suppliers’ proximity to the assemblers 
allows close communication and interdependence between them and 
enhances their mutual trust.12 Without domestic suppliers, assemblers 
would need to collaborate with foreign suppliers. The cost and time of 
communication would rise considerably. Foreign suppliers might not be 
willing to support Taiwanese assemblers because they have more important 
customers. 
Another activity to which independent suppliers made significant 
contribution is outward investment. Since the assemblers outsource many 
parts and components, they need to bring over the suppliers when they set 
up factories abroad. In fact, 23 suppliers complied with Kwang Yang’s 
request and built factories adjacent to its Changzhou factory (The Chinese 
Bank, 1996: 25). Nineteen suppliers also accompanied Sanyang’s 
investment to Xiamen (ITRI, 1996: chapter 2, 78). The suppliers were all 
                                            
11  Of course, there have been fluctuations since then. In the research in 2005, I found 
that the control of one joint venture transferred from local capital to Japanese 
company because the local founder retired. At the same time, I also discovered the case 
that one assembler subcontracted a process for attaching a tire to a wheel which had 
been done in-house to one local firm. The former case increased the ratio of Japanese 
firms, while the latter decreased the ratio. Overal,l there is considered to be no 
dramatic change. 
12  In the third section, I will show two cases showing the advantages of the local 
suppliers over Japanese subsidiaries.   14
Taiwanese firms. The reason behind their support for the assemblers was 
that they have been closely interdependent on one another in Taiwan. The 




III  Mechanism  for  Catching-up 
 
The previous section shows that Taiwan’s motorcycle industry acquired 
capacities for product innovation and established independent suppliers, 
which resulted in the completion of catching-up and independence from 
Japanese hegemony. As the next step, I argue how the industry could 
cultivate the capacity for product innovation and how it could build up the 
independent suppliers focusing on interaction among Taiwanese 
government, local firms, and leading foreign firms.   
 
Competitive Oligopoly and Accumulation of Resources 
The most significant reasons that Sanyang and Kwang Yang acquired the 
capacity for product innovation were that they held abundant resources to 
invest and competent management teams, which could skillfully use the 
resources. Of the various resources, money was the most important. They 
could purchase other resources including equipments, staff, and access to 
the sources of technology in exchange for money. 
With respect to their management team, since the two companies were 
large-scale and profitable companies, they could attract distinguished 
talent. For instance, S. C. Wang, the president of Kwang Yang, was a 
graduate from the department of mechanical engineering of National Cheng 
Kung University, which was considered the most excellent in this field in 
Taiwan. The able management team successfully converted the resources 
into capacity for product innovation. 
The mechanism for Sanyang and Kwang Yang’s growth and profitability 
was the establishment of competitive oligopoly.13 Protection from imports 
was a necessary condition, but it did not necessarily bring in growth and 
                                            
13  The Japanese automobile industry is a precedent case of industrial development 
based on competitive oligopoly within protected market. My argument was suggested 
by studies on this case, such as Muto (1984) and Ito (1988).   15
profit. First, the limited size of domestic market often prevents the firms 
from achieving economy of scale. Second, the stable profit generated by 
protection tends to make firms shirk. In particular, this negative effect 
would be intensified if the government introduces a restraint on entry lest 
the sizes of the firms contract to below efficient scale. In other words, it is 
extremely difficult for government to attain economy of scale and 
competitiveness simultaneously. Even worse, it is commonplace that 
government fails to achieve both of them. 
Taiwan’s motorcycle industry seemed not to fall into these traps. Although 
the industry had ordinarily consisted of around 10 assemblers, a few large 
firms had maintained the high rates of market share and enjoyed economy 
of scale. In particular, the market share has highly concentrated on the top 
three since the mid-1980s. S. C. Wang pointed out that “Since Taiwan’s 
market had concentrated on Sanyang, Yamaha Motor Taiwan and Kwang 
Yang since 1987 and the production of each firm had been more than 200 
thousands, these firms had afforded to do research and development” (Weng, 
1997: 99). At the same time the industry was quite competitive despite the 
high concentration ratio, owing to which the firms were never allowed to be 
slack.  
How was the competitive oligopoly built up? I argue below the fundamental 
factor, the roles of the government, local firms, and foreign leading firms, 
and the interaction among them. 
The fundamental factor was the rather large size of the island’s market. In 
the 1990s, 10 million motorcycles were held and more than one million were 
sold annually. The reason for the enlarged market in comparison with the 
population of about 20 million was considered to be the inadequate 
development of public transportation. In fact, 50 cc scooters are used for 
daily commuting. The large scale of the market alleviated the trade-off 
between economy of scale and competitiveness. 
The most important role of the government was the design and operation of 
the protection policies, including requirement for local content. Without 
these policies, Taiwan’s motorcycle industry would have never been 
established. In addition, it is also vital that the government did not 
implement any other restriction on competition. The ban on entry in the 
motorcycle industry was lifted in 1965 and was never reintroduced. As a 
result, the industry had experienced vigorous entries by the newcomers,   16
which had multiplied the severity of the competition. 
Local firms have contributed to sustaining and increasing the 
competitiveness of the market. The ambitions of two local leaders, Sanyang 
and Kwang Yang, have shaped Taiwan’s competitive market. In addition, 
there have been frequent entries and exits by small assemblers in the 
industry. Although they did not put immediate pressures on large 
assemblers, they continued to be a potential threat to them. 
Leading foreign firms had manifested conspicuous effects on building up 
oligopoly. With support from foreign firms, local firms were able to 
decisively prevail over those without the support of foreign firms. Moreover, 
the global motorcycle industry has been oligopolistic. Therefore, the number 
of latecomer firms that could conclude the contracts with these dominant 
firms was limited in one market. Of course, each dominant firm was capable 
of imparting their assistance to more than two firms in one market, but it 
would be more profitable for the dominant firm to restrain the number of 
partners. 
In the late 1980s, market concentration was rapidly augmented by the 
interaction among Yamaha Motor Taiwan, Sanyang, and Kwang Yang. The 
newly established Yamaha Motor Taiwan, directed and full backed up by 
Yamaha, initiated an aggressive strategy and only Sanyang and Kwang 
Yang could follow it immediately. The other assemblers including Tai Ling, 
Suzuki’s joint venture, failed to keep up with them. As a result, more than 
90% of the market share concentrated on Yamaha Motor Taiwan, Sanyang, 
and Kwang Yang. 
The strategy adopted by Yamaha Motor Taiwan was a combination of a new 
line-up of products and innovation of the sales system. The new sales 
system consisted of the reorganization of the sales channel led by the 
assembler and its instructions and guidance to the retail dealers. Under the 
traditional system, independent distributors (jingxiaoshang) mediated 
between the assemblers and the retail dealers, owing to which the 
assemblers were unable to directly offer instructions to the dealers. 
Therefore, the assemblers paid bare attention to promoting activities such 
as advertisement and after-sales service and entrusted the distributors to 
organize sales networks. Yamaha Motor Taiwan and other large assemblers 
reformed the system by establishing sales companies together with the 
distributors and replacing distributors with sales companies. The new   17
system enabled the assemblers to directly communicate their ideas to 
retailers through the sales companies, of which they had ownership and 
control. Yamaha Motor Taiwan promoted its brand image by instructing the 
retail outlets to remodel their layouts combining massive advertisement. 
The new line-up of products was further effective with the innovation of the 
sales system. 
Since the innovation had economy of scale and first-mover advantage, it 
contributed to concentration. Moreover, the large assemblers’ innovation 
accidentally coincided with the change of the consumers and consequently 
augmented the effect. The innovated line-up with cleanly and brightly 
renewed outlets and the freshly advertised impression admirably suited the 
newly emerged consumers such as the youth and females. 
Evidently, Yamaha Motor Taiwan’s new strategy not only increased 
concentration but also intensified competition, in particular non-price 
competition. Although the market was highly concentrated, it continued to 
be severely competitive in the 1990s due to the existence of Yamaha Motor 
Taiwan as a threat to Sanyang and Kwang Yang. They have always desired 
to seize the top share and have not allowed the others to shirk. 
 
Comparison between Motorcycle Industry and Auto Industry 
Comparing the motorcycle industry to the auto industry can enhance the 
conviction of some of the factors argued above. Taiwan’s auto industry has 
been dependent on the foreign firms, which indicates that it has not yet 
accomplished catch-up. The scale of production is small and export is even 
scarce. The case of Sanyang exhibits the contrast between the two 
industries. Although Sanyang’s motorcycle business succeeded in becoming 
independent from Honda, it continued to rely on Honda in auto production 
until the rupture in 2002. 
The poor performance can be attributed partly to much more complex 
technology of automobiles. At the same time, however, the absence of the 
competitive oligopoly, which was the clue to the leading companies’ 
accumulation of resources in the motorcycle industry, also hindered the auto 
industry from catching up. The industry has been less competitive than the 
motorcycle industry, which is shown by the fact that the exits from the 
industry have been quite rare. Except for the case of Toyota’s affiliate, 
which retreated on political account in the 1970s, there had been only two   18
cases of exit until the early 1990s. One was GM’s withdrawal from Huatung 
Motors, Ltd, which was shortly reorganized as Kuozui Motor, with 
investment by Hino Motors and Toyota; another was the bankruptcy of Yeu 
Tyan Machinery Manufacturing Co., Ltd. The market was less concentrated 
and no auto assembler produced more than 100 thousand cars annually in 
the mid-1990s. Evidently, they were not able to fully enjoy economy of scale. 
The disadvantageous structure was caused by lack of some conditions which 
the motorcycle industry satisfies. First, Taiwan’s auto market is much 
smaller than the motorcycle market, although its minimum efficient scale is 
considered to be larger than that of the motorcycle market. The annual 
sales of automobiles produced in Taiwan were 400 thousands at most. 
Consequently, the industry easily fell into a trade-off between scale of 
economy and competitiveness of the market. 
Second, the policies have not been consistent (Kawakami, 1995); they 
swung owing to the trade-off. The government strictly restrained the entry 
until 1967, but failed to discipline the firms to raise the efficiency. The 
abolition of the restriction on entry invited newcomers to enter the industry, 
which made it difficult for a firm to reach the efficient scale. The entry was 
restricted again in 1974, and the market structure was frozen. In the early 
1980s, the government drew up a plan to set up one large-scale auto maker 
in cooperation with a foreign firm, which ended in a failure due to the poor 
capability of the bureaucracy (Arnold, 1989). The government had neither 
accomplished a competitive market nor firms that could enjoy economy of 
scale. In 1985, the government not only lifted the restriction on entry but 
relaxed its control on import. The new policy implied that the government 
abandoned the strategy to develop the auto industry in a similar manner as 
the motorcycle industry.14 
Third, the global industrial structure of the auto industry was different 
from that of the motorcycle industry. A larger number of advanced firms 
were capable of providing technical support to the auto industry than to the 
motorcycle industry. As a result, more number of firms could enter the auto 
industry than the motorcycle industry. It was also more difficult for a 
                                            
14  The policy implemented in 1985 was supposed to deprive the auto makers of 
chances to become independent. However, the result was more complicated. Some 
makers succeeded in achieving partial autonomy taking advantage of the slump of 
Japanese partners which provided capital and technical assistance with them (Cheng, 
2007).   19
limited number of firms to concentrate the market shares. 
 
Flourishing Independent Suppliers 
Interactions among the government, foreign firms, and local firms also 
brought about the development of parts and components suppliers. First, 
the industrial policy was indispensable for it. As mentioned above, the 
government introduced the requirement for local content in the early 1960s 
and quickly raised the ratio. This policy not only endowed the local parts 
and components suppliers with the domestic market but also urged foreign 
firms to invest in or provide technical assistance to local firms. 
Second, foreign firms made considerable contribution to improvement in the 
suppliers’ technology and skills. One electric parts maker that I visited in 
2004 was a typical case of success in improving its technology and skill with 
the support of a Japanese partner. The company was requested to introduce 
technology and capital from a Japanese firm that produced the same type of 
products by its major customer. Its founder visited the future partner and 
discovered what the company had been lacking in before. The company had 
developed the products according to the samples and the assembly drawings 
provided by the assembler. However, since the assembler had not supplied 
the illustrations of the parts, the company had not understood the 
properties of the material. He also found that it had not undertaken an 
endurance test. The company remedied these deficiencies with assistance 
from its Japanese partner. 
It should be noted that the foreign parts and components makers’ control 
over Taiwanese partners, which they invested in or provided assistance to, 
was much weaker than the assemblers’. Taiwanese parts and components 
suppliers have been doing outward investments without constraints. The 
reason is that the foreign firms and Taiwanese partners can differentiate 
the market and avoid direct competition. Taiwanese suppliers chiefly 
transact with Taiwanese assemblers’ subsidiaries abroad and do not forcibly 
compete for the affiliates of the foreign firms’ customers. 
Third, the assemblers’ played a significant role. As exemplified by the 
abovementioned case, one of their roles was of an intermediate who 
introduced the foreign firms as an instructor to the local suppliers. Second, 
the assemblers themselves were instructors who coached the suppliers in 
technology and skill. Based on abundant and superior resources such as   20
manpower and equipment, they had more sophisticated technology and skill 
than the suppliers. Their third role was to screen out inadequate suppliers. 
K. A. Chang, the former president of Sanyang, maintained that   
“A part of suppliers say they can pass the quality inspection by 
frequently associating with Sanyang’s staff responsible for procurement 
and by repeatedly entertaining them. However we never purchase parts 
and components from such irresponsible and unenterprising firms.” 
(Chang, 1987: 190) 
Finally, the most significant factor for the development of the independent 
suppliers was the local firms’ own initiative. If they had been satisfied with 
the protected market and slackened the efforts to improve their own 
abilities, Taiwan’s motorcycle industry could not possess the independent 
and efficient parts and components suppliers. In fact, many firms did not 
realize that enhancing their abilities was necessary. However, a few of them 
recognized it as important ahead of others. For instance, in the early 1980s, 
lamp makers enjoyed considerable profits by copying the advanced firms’ 
products and most of them never invested a part of profit in their product 
development. However, a lamp maker that I visited in Sept. 26, 2005, 
determined to initiate product development despite losing money in hand. 
Today, the firm survived the change of the industry and others were weeded 
out. 
Interestingly, some local suppliers already outweigh the joint ventures 
supported by the advanced firms. One case is that of the lamp maker 
mentioned above. The maker leads a joint venture between Japanese and 
Taiwanese firms in the market of lamps for motorcycles. Another example is 
that of a meter maker. It competed with a joint venture supported by 
Japanese company and held more than 60% of the share in the island’s 
market in 2005, although the joint venture maintained about 80% of the 
share in the past. The reason for the local makers’ ascendancy is the 
assemblers’ independent product development. The local suppliers can 
respond to the assemblers more quickly than the joint ventures, which need 
coordination with Japanese partners. In other words, the emergence of local 
suppliers with R&D capabilities backed up the assemblers’ independence. 
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Conclusion and Supplementary Argument 
 
The experience of Taiwan’s motorcycle industry can be summarized as 
follows. The two largest motorcycle makers in Taiwan, Sanyang and Kwang 
Yang, had been growing technologically depending on Honda at the cost of 
their autonomy, particularly in the sphere of overseas activities, since the 
early 1960s. The two assemblers began their efforts to break through 
Honda’s hegemony in the late 1980s. The main challenge was acquiring the 
capacity for product innovation. This capacity was the key to Honda’s 
control, owing to which Honda never shared it with them. The challenge 
entailed a considerable risk that they might not release new models for 
some time because Honda would stop providing them with new designs 
before they finished learning the capacity. However, the two firms swiftly 
mastered the capacity and became independent from Honda. Another 
significant factor for the two assemblers’ autonomy is independent suppliers 
of parts and components. The assemblers not only procure many parts and 
components from them but also need their cooperation in product 
development. Furthermore, the assemblers required the suppliers to 
accompany their overseas production. Since independent suppliers are 
established in Taiwan, the assemblers can carry out these activities free 
from restraint. 
How were Sanyang and Kwang Yang able to cultivate the capacity for 
product innovation? Their success in learning can be attributed to the 
abundant resources that they invested in it and a competent management 
team, which can use the resources effectively. An established competitive 
oligopoly caused the two assemblers to grow in scale and become highly 
profitable, which, in turn, enabled them to earn considerable profits and 
accumulate distinguished managerial talent. 
Although the government’s protection is a fundamental condition, this 
policy has two traps in general. One is that firms cannot enjoy scale merits 
in the limited scale of the domestic market. The other trap is scarce 
competitiveness. Sanyang and Kwang Yang could avoid falling into these 
traps owing to large scale of Taiwan’s market and competitive oligopoly. In 
the 1980s, on the one hand, the two local assemblers and Yamaha Motor 
Taiwan surpassed other firms and succeeded in obtaining the major portion   22
of the market. On the other hand, the small firms’ vigorous entries and 
Yamaha Motor Taiwan’s aggressive strategy enhanced the competitiveness 
of the market and did not allow the two assemblers to be slack. I also 
contrast this mechanism of the motorcycle industry to Taiwan’s auto 
industry. 
The independent local suppliers of parts and components have also been 
established through interactions among the government, foreign firms, and 
local assemblers and entrepreneurs. The government’s requirement for local 
content was a foundation for the development of local suppliers. Foreign 
firms and leading assemblers have contributed to the suppliers’ skill 
formation and technological progress by way of instruction and selection. 
The most significant reason for the suppliers’ development was their own 
initiative. A few visionary firms realized that it was necessary to cultivate 
their technological capabilities beyond imitation. Their efforts have formed 
today’s solid supplier system in Taiwan. 
The experience of Taiwan’s motorcycle industry indicates some implications 
for late industrialization. First, the development of Taiwan’s motorcycle 
industry is convincing evidence that the state can play a significant role. 
Without the protected domestic market, the local assemblers could not have 
emerged and grown. Requirement for local content was a necessary 
condition for establishing local parts and components suppliers. 
Second, however, Taiwan’s experience also indicates the limitations of 
government’s intervention. Some policies are generally ineffective or 
harmful. The combination of policies is also important. The protection of the 
domestic market was applied to both the motorcycle and the auto industries. 
In the motorcycle industry, however, the restriction on new entry was lifted 
in the mid-1960s, while the policy was sustained for many years in the auto 
industry. The contrasting performance between the two industries was 
caused partly by the different policies. 
More importantly, state’s intervention is not sufficient for industrial 
development. In other words, government’s industrial policies cannot 
succeed without complementary factors. Protection is effective given the 
large size of the market. The strategies of the foreign firms and the 
domestic firms also have significant influence on the result of the policies 
determining the nature of the market, competitiveness, competition in price, 
quality, or innovation. The case argued here indicates that it is necessary to   23
modify Gerschenkron’s and Amsden’s arguments, while it supports them.15 
Third, Taiwan’s experience also contributes to deepening the understanding 
on late industrialization. It illustrates that the catching-up process is not 
monotonous and the final stage of the process has a formidable hurdle, as I 
mentioned in the beginning of this paper. While Sanyang and Kwang Yang 
had obediently learned the manufacturing technology from Honda, the 
relations between the two assemblers and Honda were harmonious and 
intimate. However, this process by no means led the assemblers to complete 
the catching-up, since Honda did not share with them the capacity for 
product innovation. They needed to switch their development paths 
defecting from dependence on Honda in order to finish the catching-up 
process. This is the hurdle that latecomers had to overcome in the final 
stage of the process. 
I also show the conditions for success in the challenge. They are a firm’s 
motivation, substitutive source of the factor necessary for completing the 
catching-up, and resource for using the alternative source. In the case of 
Taiwan’s motorcycle industry, Sanyang and Kwang Yang were motivated to 
challenge the hurdle by the limit of the domestic market. They could 
substitute the supply of new models from Honda with joint development 
with the European institutions. Their ample funds enabled them to access 
the alternative sources. Further, the competent management teams were 
extremely keen that they effectively utilize the joint project as opportunities 
for learning the capacity for product innovation. 
I ended the argument by briefly mentioning Sanyang and Kwang Yang’s 
situation after perfecting the catching-up. The two assemblers’ purpose of 
independence from Honda was to do overseas activities without restriction. 
However, their performance abroad has not been satisfactory according to 
them. With respect to the Chinese market, they succeeded in exporting a 
substantial amount of products in the early 1990s. Although they embarked 
on production afterwards, their production in China has been unsuccessful 
up until now. Sanyang set up a subsidiary in Xiamen in 1992, and Kwang 
Yang established subsidiaries in Changsha in 1993 and in Changzhou in 
1995. All their achievements have been below the plan. Kwang Yang’s 
                                            
15  My argument is also different from Wade (1990) who illustrates the role of 
government in Taiwan’s industrialization. The core of his argument is the 
leader-follower dichotomy between government and the private sector. I argue that the 
complementarity among actors is more important.   24
subsidiary in Indonesia has not even reached the planned scale. The only 
exception is Sanyang’s Vietnam affiliate. Its production in 2004 was more 
than 250 thousand. 
The difficulty in the Chinese market can be attributed to the peculiarity of 
the market (Ohara, 2006a). Since riding a motorcycle is virtually banned in 
the cities, most of the Chinese consumers reside in the non-city areas, and 
their incomes are extremely low. Therefore, it is difficult for assemblers to 
find consumers who are willing to pay more for better quality. Even 
Japanese makers including Honda have not succeeded in steadily 
expanding their shares in China like other countries. Taiwanese 
assemblers’ advantages are higher quality than local makers as well as 
lower prices than Japanese makers. However, there is no space for the 
assemblers to reap their advantages in the Chinese market. 
The difficulties faced by Taiwanese assemblers in the Southeast Asian 
market are a more serious problem for them. In addition to Kwang Yang’s 
failure in Indonesia, we should also pay attention to the absence of 
Taiwanese assemblers in Thailand whose market is considerably large. In 
these countries, Japanese rivals are so competitive that it is difficult for 
Taiwanese assemblers to acquire a part of the market. Japanese makers’ 
brands are considered an important source of their competitiveness. 
Sanyang’s exceptional success in Vietnam is due to the fact that the 
company entered this emerging market earlier than Japanese makers 
established their brand. Taiwanese assemblers’ post-catching-up 
experiences indicate that perfecting technological catching-up might be 
insufficient for latecomer firms to measure up to advanced firms. In 
particular, in overseas markets, latecomer firms also need marketing 
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